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The Wealth of Wealthholders  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper introduces the Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI), a new panel survey of 
wealthholders designed to yield high-quality measurements of a large sample of older Americans 
who arrive at retirement with significant financial assets. The VRI links survey data with a 
variety of administrative data from Vanguard. The survey features an account-by-account 
approach to asset measurement and a real-time feedback and correction mechanism that are 
shown to be highly successful in eliciting accurate measures of wealth. Specifically, the VRI data 
reflect unbiased and precise estimates of wealth when compared to administrative account data. 
The VRI sample has characteristics similar to populations meeting analogous wealth and Internet 
access eligibility conditions in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF).  To illustrate the value of the VRI, the paper shows that the relationship between 
wealth and expected retirement date is very different in the VRI than in the HRS and SCF—
mainly because those surveys have so few observations where wealth levels are high enough to 
finance substantial consumption during retirement. 
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1. Introduction 
As defined benefit pension plans become rare and as the generosity of a pay-as-you-go Social 
Security system becomes increasingly limited by aging of the population, households are 
increasingly responsible for financing their own retirement. Hence, understanding how 
individuals’ financial assets affect their retirement decisions and well-being in retirement is of 
utmost importance for understanding behavior and the welfare of the retired population, as well 
as policy changes that may affect them. Though the transition from a defined benefit to a defined 
contribution retirement system has been underway for decades, about half of households 
approaching or in retirement have relatively low financial assets. Datasets designed to represent 
the population, therefore, have surprisingly little information on older Americans with wealth 
sufficient to finance a non-trivial fraction of their retirement consumption. Our research fills this 
gap by producing an innovative new dataset containing a large number of households with 
significant financial assets to potentially use in retirement. To highlight the value of these new 
data, the paper shows that the relationship between wealth and retirement plans differs 
dramatically over the range of wealth that is sufficient to sustain consumption in retirement 
compared to that in the population reflected in standard datasets such as the Health and 
Retirement Study and the Survey of Consumer Finance.  
This paper presents results from a collaboration between the Vanguard Group, Inc. and 
academic researchers to provide measurements and analysis surrounding the behavior, 
preferences, expectations, and information of older Americans managing spending in retirement. 
Specifically, the paper presents findings from the Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI), which 
provides high-quality, linked administrative and survey data on a large sample of households that 
face or will soon face the problem of managing assets in retirement. The VRI attempts to 
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improve on measurements relative to surveys that are justifiably called the gold standard for 
wealth measurement—namely, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF)—along multiple dimensions:   
 First, we target the population of interest—i.e., older Americans with nontrivial financial 
assets. Even though the overall sample sizes are similar, the HRS and SCF actually have 
relatively small samples of the population of interest. The HRS—since it is representative of 
the entire age-eligible population—has many respondents with trivial wealth. The SCF—
since it is representative of the overall population—has many respondents who are younger.  
 
 Second, using a combination of administrative and survey data, we can address the question 
of whether—apart from having non-negligible wealth—the Vanguard population is different 
from the overall population. We draw respondents from two lines of business—those with 
individual and those with employer-sponsored accounts. We find that, especially for the 
employer-sponsored sample, the Vanguard population is broadly representative of the U.S. 
older population with non-negligible financial wealth and Internet eligibility. The VRI is 
broadly representative of households in the upper half of the wealth distribution. 
 
 Third, we take a comprehensive account-based approach to measuring assets. Under this 
approach, respondents are asked to report their financial assets account-by-account. The aim 
of this approach—which is used selectively in the HRS and SCF—is to get information from 
respondents in the form that they have it or think of it rather than by requesting responses 
using accounting or economic categories that may not be meaningful to them. 
 
 Fourth, we employ a set of survey techniques designed to elicit more accurate survey 
measures of financial assets. Respondents give meaningful nicknames to their accounts. The 
survey provides a summary of accounts and balances at various stages, so respondents can 
check whether they missed or double-counted accounts or misreported balances. 
Respondents can then make corrections without having to reenter correct items.  
 
 Fifth, we use the administrative data to validate the survey responses. We are able to show 
that our novel survey approach provides unbiased measures of the level of assets as opposed 
to the understatement typically observed in survey responses. Additionally, we can show that 
our correction mechanism does reduce the variance of response errors. 
  
Given the cost and difficulty of collecting asset data from respondents, our use of account data 
and survey data in tandem provides a roadmap for augmenting or replacing survey-based 
measures of assets in large-scale surveys. Therefore, in addition to its specific findings, this 
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paper documents and analyzes an approach that could be applied very broadly for improving 
measurement of wealth.1 
 This paper shows the importance of having ample observations in the relevant range of 
wealth by analyzing the non-linear relationship between wealth and retirement horizon. There is 
a puzzling finding in the literature on wealth and retirement: even following very large stock 
market declines—such as in 2000 to 2002 and 2007 to 2009—changes in wealth have either a 
small or no effect on retirement or on retirement plans of older Americans. Comparing changes 
in retirement rates between defined-contribution (DC) and defined-benefit (DB) pension holders 
for the period 1992–1998 using the HRS, Sevak (2002) finds that DC pension holders tended to 
reduce retirement age more during the stock market boom in the 1990s. Coronado and Perozek 
(2003) and Kthitatrakun (2004), by comparing expected and actual retirement age, show that a 
wealth gain caused by a stock market boom reduces retirement age compared to households’ 
previous expectations. In contrast, Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2012), Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder 
(2012) and Kezdi and Sevak (2004), using risky asset holdings in the HRS data as a measure of 
exposure to the stock market, estimate the wealth effect on the retirement decision and find no 
evidence of such an effect. Coile and Levine (2004) focus on aggregate labor supply measures 
from the HRS and Current Population Survey and also find no evidence. Using pre- and post-
crash interviews from the CogEcon survey conducted in 2007 and 2009, McFall (2011) finds a 
                                                 
1 This research is therefore related to an emerging program to augment or replace survey data 
with administrative records, including private account data. See Gelman et al. (2014) for high-
frequency spending and income data; Kapteyn and Ypma (2007) for earnings data; Agarwal, Liu, 
and Souleles (2007) for credit card data to measure the response of spending to income; Aguiar 
and Hurst (2007) for linking administrative data on price paid to survey data on demographics 
and time use. For the difficulties of measuring wealth and earnings in surveys, see Juster and 
Smith (1997). For systematic bias in economic measurement in surveys, see Gorodnichenko and 
Peter (2007) and Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2014). See Krimmel, Moore, Sabelhaus, and Smith 
(2013) for problems with the timeliness of asset data, which are addressed by the VRI approach. 
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relationship between wealth change and retirement age in the expected direction, though the 
estimated size of the effect is modest.2 
The VRI is designed to have greater power to detect these effects by collecting a large 
amount of high-quality asset data for households where such changes in wealth might be more 
relevant. Therefore, it addresses the problem, identified by Poterba (2014), Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise (2011) and Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2010), that in the survey datasets 
commonly used in this literature, most households do not have significant retirement wealth or 
stock market exposure. In this paper, we estimate the relationship between wealth and retirement 
plans in the VRI, HRS, and SCF. We demonstrate that this relationship is highly non-linear and 
that we can estimate the effect of wealth at the relevant range of wealth levels to be significant 
only when we have dense observations in that range. We then show, for households with enough 
wealth to typically have significant stock market exposure, that the expected retirement horizon 
varies significantly with wealth.  
 Admittedly, such estimates from the VRI are “out of sample” for the population of older 
Americans in the US—about half of whom have little wealth and little exposure to the stock 
market. Making such out-of-sample inferences is precisely the aim of the VRI. As noted at the 
outset of the paper, policy changes and changes in employer offering of pensions are pushing 
older Americans to save and invest for their retirement through 401(k) and similar accounts. To 
understand the ultimate effects of this transformation of the retirement landscape, data such as 
those from the VRI are essential. There is the concern, however, that the VRI respondents are 
                                                 
2 Some studies use other sources of variations in wealth changes. Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote 
(2001) use lottery windfall gains, while Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1993) use inheritance 
information in IRS data and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) use inheritance data in the PSID. 
Estimated effects are mostly modest, with the exception of Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen 
(1993), who find a sizeable effect. 
 5
different—not just because they have significant retirement savings, but because they are 
different from the population in terms of their demographics, socioeconomic status, or other 
characteristics. Are Vanguard clients so special that they are not a valid population for drawing 
inferences more generally?  We address this question head-on in the paper. We show that 
Vanguard clients are different from the HRS and SCF respondents mainly because they have 
more financial wealth. For HRS and SCF respondents of similar wealth, education and other 
attributes are not that different. This is particularly true in the subsets of HRS and SCF 
respondents with 401(k) plans, compared to the Vanguard employer-sponsored sample. Our 
approach to sampling Vanguard respondents—drawing separately from individual clients and 
those in employer-sponsored plans—substantially obviates concerns about selection. The VRI 
employer-sponsored sample has a retirement/wealth relationship that looks quite similar to the 
overall VRI sample. We conclude that the findings from the VRI are driven by having dense 
observations of households with significant levels of wealth and stock market exposure, not by 
differences in households that select Vanguard as a financial institution. 
 
2. Innovations in Wealth Measurement:  Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI) Approach 
What makes the VRI innovative?  First, it surveys financial wealth by accounts, not by asset 
classes. Its aim is to ask respondents to report numbers that closely correspond to how they 
receive statements and to how they might classify assets. The approach avoids asking 
respondents to map their balances into accounting or economic constructs, and does not require 
them to do addition or distribution of amounts. Second, after each step where the survey 
instrument elicits the composition or amount of assets, it shows a summary of responses in 
tabular form and allows respondents to modify their answers. Third, the survey is integrated with 
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administrative data. Administrative data create the sample frame, allow validation of survey 
responses, and create a high-frequency panel of asset data. In this section of the paper, we 
describe the design of the VRI sample and how the wealth measurements are implemented in the 
VRI survey.  
Table 1 shows in tabular form the main survey design elements and how they compare 
with those of the HRS and SCF. Section 4 provides a detailed comparison of these surveys.3   
2.1. The VRI Sample Design 
The administrative data and, more generally, the collaboration with Vanguard are critical in 
achieving the VRI objective of creating a large sample of older wealthholders. By construction, 
Vanguard clients have some wealth. Additionally, information in the Vanguard administrative 
data on customer type, account balances, age, geography, and use of the Internet are all essential 
for creating the sample. This information allows us to reach a large population of relevant 
households.  
The population for the VRI is Vanguard Group account holders aged 55 and older who 
are Web-survey eligible (must be registered for use of the Vanguard website, have a valid email 
address, and have logged on in the past six months). We stratified the sample based on the 
following characteristics from the administrative data: individual versus employer-sponsored 
accounts; age; and administratively-single status. We sampled evenly from five-year age 
intervals from 55 to 74 and from 75 and above. For those under 65, we divided the sample 
evenly between the two client types. After age 65, those in the employer-sponsored line tend to 
exit this group as they roll over their employer-sponsored accounts into IRAs accounts (either at 
                                                 
3 Ameriks et al. (2014) describes the VRI in greater detail. Readers interested in the specifics of 
sampling, testing, and design, as well as in more-detailed tabulations, are referred to that paper. 
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Vanguard or elsewhere). For this age group, we sample the types in the proportion they appear in 
the population.  
 A variety of research questions are more difficult to answer in the context of multi-person 
households. There are relatively few single households in the Vanguard population. Thus, we felt 
it useful to oversample singles to secure an adequate sample size of singles. The administrative 
data contain an imperfect indicator of single status. In particular, Vanguard constructs a 
household indicator by using common address and joint registration. Being in a single-member 
household using this indicator is strongly, but not perfectly, correlated with the survey measure 
of single status. Using information on the relationship between the survey and administrative 
measures of single status in a pilot survey, we increased the sampling rate of administratively-
single accounts in the production survey. See Ameriks et al. (2014).  
 These sampling criteria are all imposed ex ante based on the administrative data. To draw 
the sample that we invited to complete the survey, we randomly selected from the specified 
populations of account holders. We monitored our success at hitting the desired sample 
proportions, but made no adjustments after drawing the sample. We did not impose quotas of any 
kind on responses. 
2.2. Survey Measurement of Wealth in the VRI 
A key innovation of the VRI approach is to elicit assets on a comprehensive, account-by-account 
basis. This section describes this approach. The next section will show that it yields highly 
accurate measurements of assets.4 Appendix A shows screen shots of the wealth section for a 
hypothetical respondent. The steps in the wealth section are as follows.  
                                                 
4 The VRI approach is unique in taking a comprehensive, account-based approach to wealth 
measurement. The HRS and SCF take approaches that mix the account- and asset-class 
approaches. For non-retirement assets, the HRS asks respondents to aggregate the balances 
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Step 1:  Account Type. The respondents are shown a list of 15 account types divided into 
groups. The rows in Table 2 after Total Financial Assets show the types. The major groups are 
“Tax deferred-retirement accounts” (IRA, employer sponsored plans, pension with account 
balance, and other retirement assets); “Savings/Investment accounts that are not in a tax-deferred 
retirement plan or account”  (checking, savings, money market mutual funds, CDs, brokerage, 
and directly held securities); “Insurance-related accounts” (annuities with cash value and life 
insurance with cash balance); “Educational accounts”; and “Other.”  The survey displays a table 
with these account types and a checkbox for having each type. 
Step 2. Number of accounts. The survey shows a list of account types that the respondent 
has checked in step 1. The respondent is asked to indicate the number of each type of account 
using a drop-down menu.  
Step 3.  Nicknames of accounts; verification. The survey then shows a list of accounts. 
The respondent is asked to give a nickname for each account. After the respondent enters all the 
nicknames, the survey displays a summary table (see Appendix A, Figure A-A4). Respondents 
are then asked whether all the information is correct. If not, they are asked whether they want to 
                                                                                                                                                             
across accounts into the following asset classes:  stocks and stock mutual funds; bonds and bond 
mutual funds; checking, savings, and money market accounts; and CDs, government bonds, and 
Treasury bills. The SCF takes a mixed approach. For checking, savings/money market, and 
mutual funds, it asks for the number of accounts and the balance for each account. For CDs, 
savings bonds, individual stocks, and brokerages, it asks for asset-class totals as in the HRS. For 
IRAs, it asks for an inventory of types of IRA (regular, Roth, rollover) and then asks for total by 
type.  
    For pensions, the HRS and SCF take a pension-by-pension approach. The SCF household 
head reports up to three separate pension accounts for each household member; the HRS 
respondent and spouse report up to three separate pension accounts. The HRS 2012 has taken a 
step toward creating a longitudinal record of pensions. The HRS asks about IRAs (up to three 
accounts per respondent and spouse) as part of the pension module. The bifurcated structure of 
the HRS wealth measures (household basis for non-retirement assets and individual basis for 
pensions and retirement accounts) results from a strategic design decision made at the outset of 
the HRS to collect pension data as part of the labor section rather than the wealth section.  
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correct the list of accounts (either add or delete an account type or change the number of 
accounts for any type). Depending on their answers, they are brought back to either step 1 or 
step 2.  
Step 4. Balances. The survey then loops over accounts. Respondents are asked to input 
the balance of each account by its nickname.  
Step 5. Summary table of balances; verification. The survey displays a summary table of 
accounts as well as a total (see Figure A-A6). For each account, there are checkboxes for 
“referred to records.”  There is also a checkbox at the bottom of the table that asks whether 
everything is correct. If the respondent checks “No, I need to go back and make an update,” the 
screen updates with two checkboxes asking whether the respondent needs to add/delete accounts 
or correct the dollar amount. (Both can be checked. See Figure A-A7.) If the respondent 
indicates a need to correct amounts, the account summary table updates with a new column of 
checkboxes asking which need to be corrected. (See Figure A-A8.)  The survey asks only for the 
required corrections. Specifically, if the respondent clicks on the “add/delete account” box, they 
are taken back to step 1 with all previous responses pre-filled. On the other hand, if the 
respondent needs to correct only the amounts, the survey returns to step 4. Once the respondent 
returns to step 5, the respondent is again asked if the answers are correct and again allowed to 
make corrections. There is no limit on the number of times respondents can go through the 
correction sequence.  
 After the respondent indicates that the summary table of balances needs no correction, the 
survey presents follow-up questions about the composition of the accounts. First, for accounts 
other than saving/checking/MMMF, the respondents are shown the table with balances and asked 
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to enter the share of stock held in each account. The table updates and translates the share into 
dollars of stock for each account.   
Finally, the respondent again sees the table with balances. The table presents a checkbox 
for indicating whether or not each account is held at Vanguard. This table excludes account 
categories not offered at Vanguard (e.g., life insurance). This step enables comparison of 
responses with the administrative data.  
 At the end of the wealth section, the survey displays a summary table of financial wealth 
combined with two pie charts showing the stock share in the overall portfolio and the share of 
wealth at Vanguard (see Figure A-A13 for an example). The survey prompts respondents to print 
out this page, if desired. This summary was provided in the hope that this potentially useful 
measurement for survey respondents would increase the likelihood of their continued 
participation in the survey.   
2.3. Summary of VRI Wealth Measurements 
 Table 2 summarizes the distribution of financial assets from the survey. The mean of total 
financial assets (sum of accounts surveyed as described above) is over a million dollars. The 
median is about $660,000. Other than checking accounts, IRAs are the most common asset class 
and account for about one third of total assets. Employer-sponsored plans are by construction 
held by almost all employer-sponsored plan respondents, but are also common among individual 
Vanguard account holders. Similarly, mutual funds and brokerage accounts are significant non-
retirement assets in the population of Vanguard account holders.  
 Ameriks et al. (2014) describes how we collected data on non-account-based assets 
(housing, businesses, etc.). That paper also describes in greater detail the findings from the 
account-by-account approach. Notably, respondents were perhaps surprisingly willing to provide 
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details on many accounts. The median respondent provided information on seven accounts. One 
quarter provided information on 12 or more accounts. The respondents were also willing to refer 
to records, with the strong majority referring to records for all accounts. Hence, it appears that 
our approach gives us a comprehensive and accurate measure of assets. We provide evidence for 
that contention in the next section. 
 
3. Comparing Administrative and Survey Measures of Assets 
A key feature of the VRI is its combination of administrative account data and survey 
measurements of assets. As discussed above, the administrative data are a powerful tool for 
obtaining a sample frame for a wealth survey. Additionally, administrative data can supplement 
survey data by providing alternative measures of wealth, potentially at very high frequency. The 
administrative data also can be used to verify the survey measures. This section of the paper 
investigates the joint measurement properties of the survey and account data both to evaluate the 
quality of the VRI and to guide future use of administrative account data in surveys. 
3.1. Quantifying Response Errors 
The VRI contains administrative data on the account holders’ total wealth and information about 
its composition. The administrative data, though exact, are not perfect. The linking of accounts to 
clients might not be perfect, especially for married clients. Additionally, the administrative data 
are end-of-month, so intra-month transactions and changes in value can cause discrepancies 
between survey and administrative data. Nevertheless, the administrative wealth data give an 
unusually good reference point for evaluating the quality of the survey data and vice versa.  
The administrative data are, of course, limited to accounts at Vanguard. The survey was 
designed to capture all assets. To facilitate comparison of survey and administrative data, at the 
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end of the account section of the survey the respondent is shown a table listing each account and 
the survey report of its balance. Using the same format as shown in Figure A-A6 (used records), 
the respondent is asked to check a box indicating whether or not the account is at Vanguard. In 
this section, the survey measure of Vanguard wealth relies on these survey responses. Figure 1 
shows the distribution of the survey reports of Vanguard assets relative to the administrative 
data. For each decile of administrative assets, the figure shows a box and whiskers diagram of 
the distribution of the survey report of Vanguard assets. The responses are tightly bunched along 
the 45-degree line, though there are also substantial outliers. There is a slight over-reporting of 
assets in the survey relative to the administrative data. The fraction over-reported declines as 
assets increase. 
To shed some light on the difference between the administrative and survey measures, 
Table 3 splits the sample by line of business and single status. The first line of each panel shows 
the survey data, the second line the administrative, the third line the survey minus the 
administrative data, and the last line the percent difference.5  For the employer-sponsored 
sample, the median difference is $890, or 0.6%; for the individual client sample, the median 
difference is $2,623, or 1.4%. Yet, for both samples, the interquartile ranges of the differences 
are substantial.  
A long-standing concern in wealth measurement is that assets are under-reported—
because individuals forget about accounts and because they are reluctant to share account 
                                                 
5 The administrative data are the weighted average of the end of month before the survey and 
after the survey with the weight equal to the fraction of the month elapsed on the survey date. 
Percentage difference is calculated in the following way. Let SW and AW denote the survey 
wealth and the administrative wealth. Following Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) formulation 
from the gross flow literature, we define the percentage difference as 2 ൈ ሺܹܵ െ ܣܹሻ/ሺܹܵ ൅
ܣܹሻ. The main advantage of this formula is that it can be applied even when either SW or AW is 
0.  
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amounts (see Juster, Smith and Stafford (1999)). The VRI, with its account-by-account approach, 
builds on the insights of Juster and the designers of the HRS and SCF by presenting the 
respondents with a detailed list of asset types, so that they do not neglect to report certain items. 
Remarkably, the VRI data show no evidence of such under-reporting on average, so this 
approach appears to be effective. 
A potential reason for survey over-reports is that some accounts might not be linked to 
the survey respondent in the administrative data. Since the administrative records are at the 
account-holder level, they will not include a spouse’s account if it is registered solely under the 
spouse’s name. To address this issue, we conduct the same comparison only for singles, that is, 
respondents who report in the survey that they are not married or partnered. The results are 
reported in Table 3, Panels C and D. For singles, the tendency to over-report is essentially gone. 
For the singles in the individual account holder sample, median deviation is almost zero (-0.03%) 
and the interquartile range of the deviation is -2.9% to 2.2%. The difference is most acute for the 
individual client sample because employer-sponsored respondents are less likely to have a 
family-level relationship with Vanguard. In particular, note that the large upper tail of difference 
in the individual sample is dramatically reduced for singles relative to the overall sample in 
Panel B.6  
3.2   Corrections and Wealth Measurement 
 In this section, we examine how the VRI’s correction mechanism works to enhance the 
accuracy of the account data. The survey instrument not only captures the final responses, but 
also saves the initial answers. Therefore, for respondents who modified their answers after seeing 
                                                 
6 We are also able to examine whether checking records matters for accuracy of survey 
responses. Interestingly, checking records shrinks the deviation of administrative and survey 
reports, but being logged on to the Vanguard website during the survey does not play a 
significant role in this result. See Ameriks et al. (2014). 
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the summary tables, we can check whether or not their answers got closer to the administrative 
data. Figure 2 summarizes the paths respondents took through the wealth section given that they 
have multiple opportunities to correct their account inventories and balances:   
Path 1. No corrections. About two thirds of the sample (62.49%) completed the wealth 
section without making any corrections.  
Path 2. Inventory corrected before balance entered; balance not corrected. About 15% of 
respondents corrected their inventory (the first checkpoint in step 3 described in Section 
2.2), but did not correct balances.  
Path 3. Only balance corrected. About 11% of respondents corrected their balances (the 
second checkpoint in step 5) without either previously correcting their inventory or going 
back to correct after entering balances.   
Path 4. Inventory corrected, then balance corrected. About 5% of respondents corrected 
their inventory, entered their balances and then corrected their balances, but did not go 
back to revise inventory subsequent to entering balances.  
Path 5. Non-sequential corrections. About 6% of respondents made complex corrections.  
 
Specifically, these respondents typically went back to the start of the wealth section to correct the 
inventory of their accounts after having entered balances. Hence, about one third used the 
correction mechanism in some way.  
 In Table 4, we again show the percentage difference between the survey and the 
administrative Vanguard wealth, but for the initial and the final survey answers separately. 
Respondents are grouped according to the correcting paths they took. Again, the comparisons are 
done only for singles.  
 When respondents did not make any corrections, their initial responses were already very 
close to the administrative information. The interquartile range is -3.3% to 2.6% for those who 
made no corrections; for those who corrected account inventory only, it is very similar, -3.5% to 
2.5%. For respondents who corrected their balances, their initial responses seem to be noisier. 
Though the median percentage difference is close to that of those who do not correct balances, 
the pre-correction interquartile range for those who correct balances is much larger. After the 
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corrections, however, the width of the interquartile range shrinks dramatically toward that with 
no corrections. Indeed, the corrected range is a bit smaller than for those who made no 
corrections at all. Therefore, the correction mechanism did prove to be effective. 
 
4. Representing Wealthholders versus Representing Households: VRI, HRS, and SCF 
This paper studies households with non-negligible financial wealth approaching or in retirement. 
The previous sections document that the VRI provides accurate and comprehensive data on this 
group. This section addresses two interrelated questions. First, why is the VRI needed?  The 
answer is that leading surveys aimed at measuring wealth contain remarkably few respondents in 
the relevant age range with significant levels of wealth. Second, is the VRI—having achieved the 
aim of representing such wealthholders in significant numbers—unrepresentative of the 
population apart from having targeted individuals with non-negligible wealth?  We answer these 
questions through a detailed comparison of the VRI with the HRS and SCF. 
4.1. Comparing VRI, HRS, and SCF Design. Table 1 summarizes and compares the overall 
features of the VRI, HRS, and SCF. The VRI is composed of Vanguard clients at least 55 years 
old with non-negligible assets. The HRS is a representative sample of those at least 50 years old 
and their spouses. The SCF aims to be representative of wealth across all age groups. Because 
high-wealth individuals are hard to survey, its frame includes a list sample of high-income 
households.  The VRI oversamples singles and, as discussed above, screens for Web-survey 
eligibility and stratifies the samples by Vanguard line of business. The HRS and SCF do not 
impose these screens, but we use relevant variables on the HRS and SCF to construct subsets that 
match VRI sampling criteria.  
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 The last panel of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the three surveys for observations 
that meet the VRI age-eligibility (age 55 years or older). For HRS, we use the age of the 
financial respondent. The VRI is comparable in size to the HRS in this age range—about 9,000 
households in the VRI and about 11,500 in the HRS. The SCF has less than a third the number of 
respondents in this age range compared to the VRI.  
The VRI sample is much more affluent than the HRS or SCF samples. Of course, by 
design the VRI targets wealth holders while the HRS and SCF are representative, that is, they 
include the older Americans with very low assets, who are about half the population. The next 
set of results explores these differences and shows the extent to which they derive from VRI 
sampling restrictions.  
4.2. Comparing VRI, HRS, and SCF Respondents. Table 5 shows the distribution by wealth 
and age of raw household counts in the VRI age-eligible range of 55 years and older for the VRI, 
HRS, and SCF.7  It reminds us how little financial wealth the lower half of older households has. 
The total number of observations in the VRI and HRS are comparable, but their distributions of 
wealth are very different. Ninety percent of the VRI respondents have financial wealth of more 
than $100,000, and one third of them have more than a million dollars. In contrast, the HRS 
distribution has a very fat left tail. One third of the HRS sample has a negligible amount of 
financial wealth (less than $10,000) and only about a third has more than $100,000.  
The SCF, which is age-representative overall, has less than a third of the number of 
observations in the age-eligible range compared to the VRI and HRS. With the list sample of 
high-income households, the SCF has disproportionately high-wealth respondents. Even so, 
                                                 
7 The wealth measure used in the comparisons is total net financial wealth. Values of houses and 
mortgages are excluded. See Appendix B for the definition of the total financial wealth for each 
survey and how we impose similar sampling screens in the VRI, HRS, and SCF.  
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given that the SCF is not aiming at the population near or after retirement, for most of the 
wealth-age bins with non-negligible wealth, the number of households in the SCF is much 
smaller than in the VRI.  
The age distributions are also quite different across surveys. The VRI, by construction, 
has a similar number of observations for age bins 55-64 and 65-74, and about half the size for 
age 75+. The HRS has relatively more observations in the oldest age bin, while the SCF has 
about half in the youngest.  
 These tabulations illustrate vividly how the VRI is targeted for studying the financial 
decisions of those approaching or in retirement with non-trivial financial wealth. Given the stark 
differences in the VRI wealth distribution relative to the population, we need to understand the 
main determinants of these differences. In particular, does the relative affluence of the VRI 
sample derive mainly from our sampling screens or, even taking into account these screens, is a 
sample based on Vanguard clients very different from the U.S. population?  In the following, we 
try to disentangle these effects by examining the effect of VRI eligible screens in the HRS and 
SCF. The screen requires Internet eligibility and that households have at least $10,000 in a non-
transactional financial account.  
 These screens are restrictive in the HRS and SCF samples in this age group. Table 6 
shows how the screens affect the number of eligible households by age. For the HRS and SCF, 
the first columns of counts impose just age-eligibility. The second columns impose “VRI 
eligibility” (Internet eligibility and the $10,000 minimum balance in non-transactional financial 
accounts). The third column imposes “401(k) subset” (at least $10,000 in a DC pension account). 
Note that these screens are imposed ipso facto in the VRI for both employer-sponsored and 
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individual client groups.8  For the HRS and SCF, the screen yields relatively small subsets of 
age-eligible respondents. For the HRS, only about a third satisfy VRI eligibility. In the SCF, a 
relatively larger fraction of households satisfy these conditions owing to oversampling of high-
income households. The size of the 401(k) subset group is much smaller in both the HRS and the 
SCF. In VRI, the age distribution is flat by design. (Everywhere, there are few of the oldest 
groups represented in the employer-sponsored samples because most retirees roll over their 
401(k) to an IRA and therefore are represented in the individual client sample.)  In the HRS and 
SCF, the screen has more of a bite for older groups. See Appendix C for implications for wealth 
by age. 
In Table 7, we show that the effects of the VRI screens are similar in the HRS and SCF in 
terms of weighted sample.9 Imposing Internet eligibility alone reduces the weighted sample by 
about half in both HRS and SCF. The asset cut-off has a similar effect. Because these two 
conditions are highly correlated, there is an only incremental additional effect when taken 
together. Within the VRI-eligible samples in both the HRS and the SCF, only half of the 
weighted sample has at least $10,000 in DC pension accounts.  
 A key question is, after imposing comparable sampling screens, how similar are the 
characteristics of VRI compared to those of the subsamples of the HRS and SCF?  The answer is 
that they are not so different under VRI-equivalent sampling screens. Table 8 shows the wealth 
                                                 
8 The two screens in VRI are constructed to be mutually exclusive to avoid inviting respondents 
twice. Therefore, the second and third columns of VRI counts sum to the first column.  
9 Up to now, we have focused on raw counts of observations in order to give a concrete sense of 
the size of the samples across the surveys. Since the SCF oversamples high-income individuals, 
these households are assigned smaller sampling weights. Similarly, the HRS oversamples blacks 
and Hispanics (in order to make statistically significant inferences by groups) and residents of 
Florida (because of the cost saving in reaching older respondents there). In the following 
analysis, all the comparisons are made after weighting observations from the HRS and SCF with 
the corresponding sampling weights.  
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distributions from the VRI, HRS and SCF. From this point forward, HRS and SCF tabulations 
use sampling weights. With only age eligibility, median values from the HRS and SCF are an 
order of magnitude smaller than the corresponding numbers from the VRI. When we impose the 
VRI eligibility screen, the gaps are dramatically reduced, though there are still important 
differences. The remaining gap is smaller if the HRS and SCF subsamples are compared with the 
employer-sponsored sample in the VRI. The 90th percentile from the VRI-eligible subsample of 
the SCF is actually larger than the one from the VRI employer-sponsored group. Recall that for 
the employer-sponsored group the potential self-selection issue is mitigated, since the availability 
of Vanguard funds in their retirement plan results from their employers’ decision making. To 
more closely mimic the asset cut-off imposed on the employer-sponsored group in the VRI, we 
also made tabulations on the HRS and SCF subgroup composed of households with at least 
$10,000 in their 401(k) or similar pension accounts. The results are reported in the third row of 
the HRS and SCF panels. On average, the 401(k) subset of the HRS is wealthier than the overall 
HRS VRI-eligible sample, while the 401(k) subset in the SCF is less wealthy. The means of the 
401(k) subsets in the SCF and HRS are closer to those of the VRI employer-sponsored sample, 
though the VRI is less right-skewed. Nonetheless, it is reassuring that there is broad similarity 
between the 401(k) subsets of the SCF and HRS and the VRI employer sample.  
 Appendix C provides a more detailed comparison across the surveys. It compares across 
dimensions including income and demographics. Compared to the total population of the HRS 
and SCF in the same age range, the VRI sample has much more wealth, a much higher education 
level, better health, and a greater likelihood of being coupled.  Most of these differences, 
however, can be explained by the effect of the sampling screens we imposed in the VRI panel. 
What is special about the VRI sample is that it is selected for non-trivial asset holding and use of 
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the Internet. Once these criteria are imposed, the VRI looks quite similar to the upper half of the 
wealth distribution in the HRS and SCF. There is a bit of residual higher education, better health, 
and high wealth-to-income ratio in the VRI compared to the relevant HRS and SCF populations. 
Yet the principal differences between the VRI and the general populations do not appear to be 
attributable to selection to Vanguard participation per se. For the employer-sponsored sample, 
the differences in the characteristics essentially disappear once VRI-eligible criteria are imposed 
on the HRS and SCF.  
4.3.  Stock Share 
The extent of stock ownership looms large in discussions of how individuals will manage under 
defined-contribution retirement plans. The VRI wealth survey asks for stock share on an 
account-by-account basis. Table 9 compares the stock share of the VRI with those of the HRS 
and SCF. Panel A reports stock shares while Panel B reports stock amount. Again, we see the 
importance of having a relevant sample. Compared to the VRI, if we impose only age eligibility, 
the HRS and SCF have much lower stock shares across almost all of the distribution. Compared 
to the median share of 55% in VRI, the median share is 0% in the HRS and close to 0% in the 
SCF. Conditioning, however, on the VRI sample screens, the median shares in HRS and SCF are 
still lower, but much closer to those of VRI. The left tail in the HRS still shows less stock 
ownership, but SCF and VRI are similar across the distribution.10  The picture is similar with 
regard to the amounts of stock in panel B of Table 9. Hence, as with the level of wealth, the 
Vanguard respondents are less unrepresentative once the screen is imposed. But again, note that 
the VRI has a much larger sample of stock holders, so any analysis of portfolios should be much 
more precise. 
                                                 
10 Note that the HRS 2012 stock shares in 401(k) or similar accounts are not yet cleaned and 
imputed, so they are excluded (numerator and denominator) from these HRS stock shares.  
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5. Wealth and Retirement:  Lessons from Data on Wealthholders 
We have established that the VRI approach leads to substantially larger samples of older 
households with relevant levels of wealth for many important decisions surrounding retirement 
and well-being in older age. Having dense observations across the relevant ranges is particularly 
important if the relationships between wealth and other behaviors are non-linear. Poterba, Venti 
and Wise (2011) show that for the majority of households surveyed in the HRS, the lack of 
demand for additional annuity income simply comes from having very low annuitizable wealth. 
Similarly, there is a substantial literature on how wealth and shocks to wealth affect retirement 
(e.g., Sevak (2002), Bosworth and Burtless (2010), Goda, Shoven and Slavo (2012), McFall 
(2011), and Coronado and Dynan (2012), among others). Again, for the majority of households 
that approach retirement with little financial wealth, how levels or changes in wealth affect 
decision-making is a very different question than for those who have significant savings for 
retirement.  
In this section, we demonstrate that for the relationship between expected retirement date 
and wealth, having data that are dense in the VRI wealth ranges yields substantially clearer 
inferences than is possible with existing datasets. In particular, we investigate the relationship 
between current accumulated financial wealth and how long individuals plan to keep working.  
The VRI is designed as a panel, though this paper analyzes the first survey. To study the 
wealth/retirement relationship, we use the relationship between retirement expectations and 
wealth in the cross-section.11  Thus, we build on the tradition of using expectations rather than 
                                                 
11 The VRI holds the promise to examine reaction to events as the panel builds over time. We do, 
however, have a panel aspect even with the cross-section of wealth from the survey from the 
administrative data. We have done some exploratory work using the administrative data panel to 
examine the effect of the financial crisis on VRI respondents. Note that the VRI was collected in 
2013. By then, the stock market had recovered from the 2008/9 decline. By consulting the 
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realizations as the outcome variable. See McGarry (2004), Chan and Stevens (2004), and 
Szinovacz, Davey, and Martin (2014). The use of subjective probability variables relies on 
substantial experience showing the validity of these measures in the HRS and other surveys. See 
Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Hurd and McGarry (2002). 
5.1. Specification 
In this section we present an exploratory analysis that is designed to reveal how data such as the 
VRI can shed light on variables that determine retirement decision-making. The estimates should 
not be taken as a structural relationship because of the obvious joint determination of retirement 
and saving. 
To measure current financial wealth in a way that is meaningful for thinking about 
expected retirement, we construct normalized financial wealth RiW as 
   65(0.06 1.03 ) /   iageRi i iW W Y  
where iW  is annuitizable financial wealth, iY  is current income, and agei  is the current age of the 
main earner of the household.12  Normalized wealth is a rough-and-ready measure of how much 
current wealth could replace current income assuming no additional saving. See Brown (2001) 
for a similar measure, but converting flows to a stock. The calculation assumes a 0.06 
annuitization rate and a 3 percent real rate of return. The use of a fixed rate of return and a 
uniform annuity rate is a simple way to put current wealth of future retirees into common units. 
                                                                                                                                                             
administrative data, we find that most VRI respondents invested passively over the financial 
crisis. That is, their stock share moved by roughly the amount consistent with little rebalancing. 
As a consequence of this prudent investment strategy and the recovery of the market, there is, in 
fact, little lasting effect of the crisis on VRI respondents’ wealth overall. 
12 Annuitizable financial wealth is the sum of retirement and non-retirement financial assets. To 
put these on the same tax basis, we use another rough-and-ready approximation. Specifically, we 
presume a 25 percent average tax rate on withdrawals from qualified plans. Note that we do not 
have good data separating Roth and non-Roth treatment, so all qualified plans are combined in 
this calculation. The main findings are robust with respect to the assumed tax rate.  
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We compound returns until age 65 rather than the expected retirement date to avoid putting 
expected years of work on both sides of the equation. We estimate the relationship 
 1 2( )
R R R
i i i i i iH W W Y Z        (1) 
where iH  is the difference between the expected age of retirement and current age, RiW is  
normalized financial wealth, RiY  is expected DB pension plus Social Security divided by current 
income, and Zi  is a vector of covariates (age, dummies for education and health, and marital 
status).13  The coefficient 1( )
R
iW is a potentially non-linear function of normalized wealth.  
5.2.  Variables and Sample for Wealth-Retirement Analysis 
We focus on estimates of this relationship in the VRI and HRS. We also show the same analysis 
using the SCF data, but due to the small number of observations in the relevant age group and 
lack of some variables used—health of respondents and expected Social Security income—the 
results are not entirely consistent with the specification used for the VRI and HRS and the 
estimated relationship is much less precise. In the VRI, expected retirement is measured using 
the response to a question, “At what age do you expect to completely retire?”14  Both VRI and 
HRS have questions about current and expected pension and Social Security income. For singles, 
R
iY  is simply the sum of expected pensions and Social Security divided by current income. For 
couples, it is this sum across the couple.15  
                                                 
13 We assume that DB pension is taxed at the same 25 percent average rate as distributions from 
qualified plans. To account for the partial non-taxability of Social Security benefits, we apply a 
15 percent average tax rate to them. The main findings are again robust with respect to different 
tax rates assumed.  
14 In HRS, the expected retirement age is the result of a complex sequence starting with whether 
an individual plans to retire and at what age or date. 
15 If one member of the couple is retired, we use the current retirement income for that person 
plus the expectations for the non-retired person. 
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For simplicity, we limit the sample to households with just one main earner who has not 
yet retired and is aged 65 or younger. For singles, anyone not retired and is aged 65 or younger is 
in the sample. For single worker couples, the household is included if the worker is aged 65 or 
younger. These include single-worker households or dual-worker households in which one is 
now retired. For both these households and singles, the retirement decision is for a single worker. 
The assets and income used in the analysis reflect any retirement income or assets of the already-
retired spouse. For dual-worker households, the joint retirement is more complex. We only 
include households that appear to have only one primary earner, and we base the retirement 
decision on that household member.16  There are 2,026 households in the VRI sample and 1,053 
in the HRS sample. See Appendix D for details.  
5.3.1  Estimates: Entire Sample 
Figure 3 compares the distribution of normalized wealth across the VRI and HRS. The curves 
shown are kernel densities where the solid lines are for the VRI while the dashed lines are for the 
HRS. Panel A shows the entire sample analyzed in this section, while Panel B examines the 
employer-sponsored subsets. Panel A shows the stark difference in the wealth distribution 
between the two surveys documented in Section 4. Recall that normalized wealth is roughly the 
extent to which current wealth could replace current income at retirement if all assets were 
devoted to retirement income. In the VRI, observations are dense and fairly uniformly spread in 
the range from 0 to 0.5, and observations with normalized wealth between 0.5 and 1 are not rare. 
A non-negligible fraction of households have normalized financial wealth larger than 1. In 
                                                 
16 To determine the primary earner, we use expected Social Security income and defined benefit 
pensions as a proxy for who has larger lifetime earnings. If one of the members has expected 
Social Security and DB pension at least four times larger than the other earner, he or she is 
classified as the main earner and the household is included in the sample. Otherwise, the 
household is dropped from this analysis. 
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contrast, in the HRS the vast majority of the households have a replacement rate lower than 0.5. 
A trivial fraction of observations has a replacement rate close to or higher than 1. This 
observation confirms the point made by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011): relatively few 
households in the broad population have significant levels of potentially annuitizable wealth. 
Now consider the relationship between this measure of current assets and plans for 
continued work. To capture the non-linear relationship between retirement horizon and wealth 
holdings without imposing a restrictive functional form, we estimate LOESS regressions.17 
Figure 4 shows the results for the VRI and HRS. Again, Panel A shows the entire sample 
analyzed in this section. Panel B examines the employer-sponsored subsets.18  In Figure 4, “x” 
denotes HRS (orange/dashed) and “o” denotes VRI (blue/solid). The LOESS curve is shown as a 
line with the shaded area indicating the 95% confidence interval. The y-axis of Figure 4 is 
measured in expected remaining years of work (mean zero because it is a residual). In the VRI 
for the entire sample in Figure 4A, we see the clear negative relationship between normalized 
wealth and retirement horizon up to the full replacement rate around 1. Moving from zero 
annuitizable wealth to annuitizable wealth that could replace current income corresponds to a 
reduction in expected years of work by about 1.7 years. After that level, the estimated 
relationship flattens out. (For very high levels of annuitizable wealth, the bulk of wealth likely 
will not be used for routine consumption in retirement.) Over the entire range, the estimates are 
quite precise. In the HRS, the estimated relationship is very different. It shows a negative 
relationship up to the replacement rate 0.3, a slightly positive correlation in the range of 0.3 to 
                                                 
17 LOESS is a bivariate procedure. To deal with the covariates, we first project the retirement 
horizon on the variables in equation (1) excluding normalized wealth. The LOESS estimate is the 
regression of this residual on normalized wealth. For the HRS sample, both stages used sampling 
weights. 
18 The ranges of the horizontal and vertical axes are truncated to exclude outliers. Appendix D, 
Figure A-D1, shows the data in Figure 4A for the entire sample including outliers. 
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0.4, and then becomes flat after that. The change in years worked is about the same as in the 
VRI, but it occurs at much lower levels of annuitizable wealth. Given the low density of data in 
this range, the flattening of the LOESS line for higher levels of wealth occurs by construction. 
The HRS data simply cannot capture how the relationship changes over this range because there 
are so few observations. 
Having ample data over the relevant ranges of wealth clearly affects the precision of the 
estimates. The VRI confidence interval is narrower due to the larger number of observations. The 
HRS confidence interval gets wider after the replacement rate of 0.25, as the number of 
observations gets smaller very quickly for individuals with annuitizable wealth sufficient to 
replace even a quarter of their income prior to retirement.  
5.3.2. Estimates:  Employer-Sponsored Sample 
One concern about the VRI design is that the behavior of Vanguard clients might be very 
different from that of the general population. We can address this issue by considering whether 
or not the behavior of the VRI employer-sponsored sample differs from that of the individual 
client sample. Because the employer-sponsored clients come to Vanguard owing mainly to their 
employers’ choices, they are much less self-selected than the individual account holders. This 
prior is borne out by the Section 4 results, which show that the characteristics of the VRI 
employer-sponsored sample are quite similar to subsets of the HRS and SCF with DC pension 
accounts. Figure 3B confirms that after imposing similar screens, the distribution of normalized 
wealth looks much more similar across the VRI and HRS.  
In Figure 4B, we show the relationship between wealth and retirement plans for the 
employer-sponsored samples of the VRI and HRS. The general inference drawn by comparing 
the VRI and HRS for the entire sample also holds for this subset, though the HRS curve is 
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somewhat closer to the VRI curve. The HRS relationship in Panel B has a steep decline for lower 
levels of wealth, but then goes essentially flat as in Panel A.  Likewise, the change in retirement 
plans shown in Panel B for the VRI is larger than in the HRS over the relevant range, e.g., 0.25 
to 0.75, and the HRS LOESS line is below the VRI confidence interval in this range. Hence, 
although the HRS estimates are quite imprecise for the 401(k) subset in Panel B owing to the 
paucity of data, the basic message of the entire VRI sample holds in the employer-sponsored 
samples. Therefore, the key results derived from the VRI appear to be driven by having dense 
data over relevant wealth ranges and not by self-selection by individuals into a relationship with 
Vanguard. 
In Appendix D, we estimate the version where we include ௜ܻோ in normalized wealth 
instead of treating it as a control. Since HRS households have significant pension and Social 
Security wealth, the support of retirement resources is different—but less so—from the VRI than 
for financial resources alone. Nonetheless, a similar picture emerges in the analysis that includes 
௜ܻோ because of the difference in financial wealth.  
5.3.3. Estimates: SCF 
Figure 5 reports the result from the SCF for the entire sample (Panel A) and the 401(k) subset 
(Panel B). Due to a small number of households in the relevant age interval, we have only 233 
observations satisfying all the criteria to be included in the analysis.19 The SCF does not have 
expected Social Security benefit information, so the estimates are not entirely parallel with those 
for the VRI and HRS, which is why we do not plot the VRI in Figure 5. The small sample size 
makes the estimates extremely imprecise. The LOESS curve moves substantially, but not 
statistically significantly.  The SCF was not specifically designed to study retirement saving, so it 
                                                 
19 We use only one replicate from each household to avoid difficulties in computing confidence 
intervals in the non-linear setting of this application. 
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is not a criticism of that dataset that it has little power to address the relationship between wealth 
and expected retirement. Nonetheless, our finding points to the importance of collecting data that 
are relevant for the question. 
5.4.  Would a Stock Market Crash Significantly Impact Retirement Plans? 
In the future, as workers increasingly rely on DC pension plans, they will need to have sufficient 
DC wealth in order to sustain retirement consumption. If history is precedent, many will invest 
significantly in equities during their working years. As such, ever more households will find their 
retirement finances to be vulnerable to equity-market crashes. How these crashes affect 
retirement horizons is therefore of great interest. In this section we show that the VRI panel is far 
better suited than is the HRS to understanding these effects.  
An important approach to estimating the relationship between wealth and the retirement 
horizon is to examine how individuals react to stock market crashes. In their HRS-based work on 
this topic, Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2012) estimate the difference in the retirement horizon 
associated with the reduction in wealth associated with a 40% drop in the stock market to be 
essentially zero, even when they condition on stock ownership. In Figure 6, we use the LOESS 
estimates presented in Figure 4 to make a parallel calculation.  Specifically, we take a 
representative stockholder to have mean normalized wealth of 0.51 and mean stock share of 
55%. These are the means from the VRI sample used in the LOESS estimation. When we apply 
the 40% drop in the stock market to this representative stockholder, the effect on wealth is 
0.4 ൈ 0.51 ൈ 0.55 ൌ 0.112. This 11 percent drop in the replacement rate of income is non-
negligible. Using data from the HRS, the LOESS estimates suggest a flat relationship between 
wealth and the retirement horizon at the wealth level of the representative stockholder. Hence, 
our calculation confirms the finding of Goda, Shoven, and Slavov that there is no clear effect of 
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stock market crashes on the retirement horizon in HRS data. The estimated relationship in HRS 
data is much steeper at the wealth level of the typical HRS individual, but the effect is still 
limited due to lower mean wealth and stock share.  
In the VRI, the relationship is quite different because it shows a strong correlation 
between wealth and the retirement horizon at the wealth level of the representative stockholder. 
Since a significant wealth change is combined with the steep slope of the wealth-retirement 
horizon relationship estimated in the relevant wealth range, the implied change in the retirement 
horizon corresponds to an additional 4 months of work. Also, the narrow confidence intervals in 
this wealth range that we observed from the VRI curves in Figure 4 imply that the estimated 
effect would be statistically significant. (Panel B of Figure 6 considers alternative scenarios 
under the VRI estimate. With a higher stock share (70%) the increase in retirement horizon is 
about 6 months. At a higher replacement rate (1.0), however, the effect is smaller due to the 
flatter LOESS curve.)  Hence, the representative stockholder is so poorly represented in the HRS 
that estimates of effects of stock market crashes on expected retirement will be very misleading 
using HRS data.  
As the analysis in this section makes clear, with the HRS and SCF it is hard to capture the 
relationship between wealth and retirement behavior of those with high levels of annuitizable 
wealth. The bottom line is that VRI respondents have far more potential in exploring the effect of 
wealth on the retirement behavior of the population under an institutional and policy regime in 
which DC plans are the dominant source of retirement income. Developing and estimating a full 
structural model that can capture the impact of exogenous stock market shocks on labor market 
behavior is one of the many tasks ahead of us in further developing the VRI. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper has introduced a new approach and new dataset—the Vanguard Research Initiative—
for measuring the wealth of wealthholders. Based on a partnership between academic researchers 
and the Vanguard Group, we have developed a new survey-administrative dataset. It provides a 
large, high-quality sample of households that have substantial wealth for financing retirement 
corresponding to the upper half of the wealth distribution of older Americans. Wealth 
measurement is based on a comprehensive account-by-account approach that is designed to elicit 
accurate information in the form that respondents think about it and have at their disposal. The 
data infrastructure makes use of high-quality administrative data at all stages of the analysis—
establishing the sample frame, sending invitations, evaluating selective responses, evaluating 
quality of survey responses, and—ultimately—providing a distinct dataset. By collecting survey 
and administrative data in tandem, this project aims to demonstrate how large-scale surveys can 
make increasing and effective use of administrative data for wealth measurement. Given the 
challenges and costs of collecting surveys, these advances should inform measurement practice 
going forward. Based on the approach presented in this paper, it may be possible to replace 
expensive, infrequent, and error-ridden survey measures of wealth with administrative account 
data.  
The research also informs practice for collecting wealth data within surveys. In particular, 
the account-based approach to survey measurement of wealth yields measurements that are 
unbiased relative to administrative measurements. In contrast, many surveys appear to 
undercount assets. Additionally, the paper demonstrates that the correction mechanism 
significantly reduces the variance of errors relative to the administrative account data. 
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 Administrative data are by definition free from reporting error, so tend to have much less 
measurement error. Administrative data alone, however, might not provide enough information 
for research. In many cases, they do not include a rich set of important demographic variables. 
Sometimes they capture only a part of the household balance sheet (examples include the 
administrative Vanguard wealth data used in VRI and TIAA-CREF data used in Ameriks and 
Zeldes (2004)). Measurement error can also occur while processing data. Browning, Crossley 
and Winter (2014) provide a valuable summary of these issues. Hence, to get a better picture of 
households’ economic conditions, it is often necessary to link survey data to administrative data 
so that we can address the shortcomings of both types of data. As a linked dataset with, on the 
one hand, detailed survey measures of household finance and other economically important 
characteristics and, on the other hand, monthly-frequency observations on balances and 
compositions of their Vanguard assets, the VRI enables us not only to validate survey responses 
with the administrative data, but also to conduct research that requires high-frequency data on 
financial situations. 
The design of this VRI infrastructure is targeted at measuring the wealth of households 
with sufficient financial assets so they face wealth allocation and accumulation decisions 
concerning whether to work longer, whether to annuitize, whether to buy long-term care 
insurance, how much to bequeath, and so on. In other papers that also leverage the VRI, we are 
investigating some of these questions in detail. In this paper, we make several substantive 
contributions beyond evaluating the quality of the VRI measurement. We show that the VRI is 
dense in data on older Americans in the upper half of the wealth distribution compared to other 
excellent surveys with wealth data, namely the HRS and SCF. We show that for one key 
variable—how much longer they expect to work—the VRI indeed provides a very different 
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picture from the HRS and SCF precisely because it has sufficient observations with households 
with substantial financial wealth as they approach retirement. 
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Table 1. Design of VRI, HRS, and SCF 
 VRI HRS SCF 
Sampling    
Population  Vanguard clients  U.S. Population U.S. Population 
Frequency Multiple surveys per year; monthly admin. data Biennial Triennial  
Panel/cross-section Panel Panel Cross-section1 
Main target Age 55+ with non-negligible financial assets Age 50+ and spouses Representative of wealth 
Oversampling Singles Blacks and Hispanics; 
Residents of Florida 
High-income list sample 
Additional screens Internet eligible; 
Employer-sponsored and individual client samples 
  
Wealth measurement    
Account-based approach Comprehensive 401(k)/IRA2 Transactional and pension 
accounts 
Administrative data  Yes No No 
Summary (age>55)    
Households  8,950 11,595  2,624 
Median Financial Wealth $663,100 $60,000 $33,200 
Median Income $121,481 $30,400 $42,610 
Note: Table refers to most recent wave of each survey (VRI 2013, HRS 2012, and SCF 2013).  Observations are restricted to 
respondents aged 55 and older.  The VRI and SCF survey only one member of couples.  The age of the household is determined by the 
age of respondent.  The HRS surveys HRS respondents and their spouses.  The age of the household is determined by the age of the 
financial respondent as defined by the HRS. 
1 The SCF occasionally (1983-89, 2007-09) has a panel structure. 
2 HRS implemented account-based approach for retirement accounts in 2012. 
  
Table 2. Survey Financial Assets:  All respondents 
 
  
Conditional on having positive amount 
    
Percentiles 
Account type Mean N Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Total financial assets 1,189,358 8,948 1,189,358 122,000 296,673 656,962 1,266,651 2,254,000 
IRA 359,181 7,303 440,184 29,000 83,931 234,033 556,527 1,021,000 
Employer sponsored 215,620 4,630 416,803 26,000 83,000 222,000 475,000 842,402 
Pension 25,365 1,016 223,437 10,518 34,000 100,000 251,000 590,714 
Other retirement asset 13,237 602 196,801 10,000 26,136 80,466 213,000 450,000 
Checking 16,888 8,637 17,500 1,000 2,200 5,500 15,000 40,000 
Saving 23,020 6,162 33,436 500 2,100 10,000 32,000 84,382 
Money market 28,308 4,076 62,158 1,200 5,367 22,177 69,303 151,023 
Mutual fund 231,577 3,942 525,777 8,500 30,000 114,000 309,000 690,000 
Certificate of deposit 16,576 1,634 90,794 4,000 11,000 34,450 100,000 230,803 
Brokerage 181,872 4,184 389,042 6,400 27,100 110,000 347,000 854,000 
Directly held 
securities 
22,634 1,801 112,477 2,000 10,000 30,000 100,000 235,664 
Annuity  20,811 1,163 160,150 13,000 35,000 94,500 200,000 365,000 
Life insurance 21,053 2,696 69,891 5,000 10,000 26,000 70,000 150,000 
Educational related 3,022 613 44,119 3,400 8,300 20,000 48,000 100,000 
Other accounts 9,930 429 207,165 1,500 10,000 46,000 195,000 478,000 
Note:  Pension, annuity, and life insurance are current cash values. 
 
Table 3. Total Vanguard Assets:  Survey versus Administrative Data 
 
A.  Employer-Sponsored (N=2,243) 
  
Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 331,753 27,000 75,000 195,485 432,000 755,000 
Administrative 299,540 29,519 69,668 181,375 400,707 656,832 
Difference 32,213 -27,394 -4,093 890 12,999 95,978 
% Difference 3.92% -17.44% -2.48% 0.63% 9.10% 47.83% 
 
B.  Individual client (N=6,705) 
 
  Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 517,724 29,000 87,017 260,000 615,081 1,178,158 
Administrative 380,277 25,345 67,382 193,682 472,732 900,747 
Difference 137,447 -23,315 -1,637 2,623 91,950 380,262 
% Difference 18.53% -14.42% -1.20% 1.44% 32.89% 100.32% 
 
C.  Employer-Sponsored, Singles (N=585) 
 
  Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 240,488 22,000 49,000 125,000 300,000 574,000 
Administrative 231,306 22,757 46,236 127,630 282,362 529,760 
Difference 9,183 -24,297 -3,867 365 7,483 35,390 
% Difference 2.05% -22.06% -3.04% 0.33% 6.21% 29.68% 
 
D.  Individual client, Singles (N=2,349) 
 
  Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 317,004 21,000 57,000 165,400 420,000 790,000 
Administrative 305,997 22,501 58,759 160,638 406,609 744,563 
Difference 11,008 -32,803 -4,180 -19 3,902 39,677 
% Difference -0.64% -22.23% -2.91% -0.03% 2.18% 24.34% 
Table 4. Comparison of Total Vanguard Wealth: Different Correction Paths (Singles only)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Percent Difference 
      
Correction paths N Measure 
25 
percentile 
median 75 
percentile 
None 1927 Final -3.3 -0.0 2.6 
Accounts only 426 Initial -3.5 0.1 2.5 
  
Final -3.5 0.1 2.5 
Balances only 308 Initial -12.2 -0.0 13.6 
  
Final -2.6 -0.0 2.7 
Accounts and 
balances 121 Initial -5.3 -0.1 12.1 
(restarted) 
 
Final -1.1 0.2 2.1 
Accounts and 
balances 153 Initial -18.1 -0.1 2.7 
(other paths) 
 
Final -1.4 0.1 2.7 
Table 5.  Comparing VRI to Age-Eligible HRS and SCF Households (unweighted counts):  Age and Financial Wealth 
 
  Financial Wealth  
Age  <$0 $0-10K $10K-100K $100K-500K $500K-1M $1M-2.5M >$2.5M All 
55-64 
VRI 48 36 292 1,147 871 762 181 3,337 
HRS 1,459 586 933 897 287 160 41 4,363 
SCF 228 170 196 254 102 119 212 1,281 
65-74 
VRI 16 19 258 1,117 985 1,066 377 3,838 
HRS 746 487 727 817 290 162 35 3,264 
SCF 93 114 118 155 68 91 178 817 
> 74 
VRI 2 4 95 549 461 472 192 1,775 
HRS 800 712 1,030 927 284 172 43 3,968 
SCF 60 93 115 107 31 30 90 526 
Total 
VRI 66 59 645 2,813 2,317 2,300 750 8,950 
HRS 3,005 1,785 2,690 2,641 861 494 119 11,595 
SCF 381 377 429 516 201 240 480 2,624 
Note: Numbers are raw counts (unweighted) of households. Note that only age-eligible households are included in the table. For SCF, 
only one replicate is included. For HRS, only those households surveyed in both the 2010 and 2012 waves are included. Age of HRS 
households based on financial respondent.  Financial wealth is the sum of financial assets (both retirement and non-retirement assets) 
minus non-mortgage debt.  
 
 
  
Table 6.  Comparing Age-eligible VRI, HRS, and SCF Households (unweighted counts):  VRI Sampling Screens 
 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age All 
Employer- 
Sponsored 
Individual 
client 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
401(k) 
subset 
 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
401(k) 
subset 
All 8,950 2,244 6,706   11,595 3,684 1,553  2,624 1,275 665 
55-59 1,549 810 739   2,364 976 628  668 397 280 
60-64 1,788 823 965   1,999 756 411  613 350 205 
65-69 1,931 419 1,512   1,282 535 214  462 257 112 
70-74 1,907 157 1,750   1,982 638 178  355 161 51 
75-100 1,775 35 1,740   3,968 779 122  526 110 17 
Note:  Table shows total age-eligible number of households in total and after imposing the VRI-equivalent screen.  VRI-eligible screen imposes Internet 
eligibility plus having at least $10,000 in any non-transactional financial accounts.  The 401(k) subset imposes $10,000 wealth cut-off on DC type pensions.  See 
text for details. See also the note to Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Fraction of weighted observations 
 
Screens HRS  SCF 
Age-eligible 100%  100% 
Internet eligibility 56%  58% 
$10,000 asset cut-off 58%  45% 
Internet eligible and $10,000 cut-off 41%  35% 
401(k) subset 19%  18% 
Note:  Table shows the fraction of the sample in HRS and SCF (measured by the fraction of weighted observations) remaining after 
imposing VRI sampling screens.  See text and note to Table 6 for descriptions of screens.   
  
Table 8.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Wealth distribution 
 
   Percentiles 
  
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
VRI 
All 1,206,594 115,337 292,000 663,100 1,286,000 2,291,235 
Employer-sponsored 847,349 65,050 185,600 496,350 1,029,700 1,856,005 
Individual client 1,326,807 140,100 330,636 715,790 1,383,209 2,421,840 
HRS 
Age eligible 293,596 -900 500 60,000 300,000 745,000 
VRI eligible 578,069 34,000 98,036 272,000 660,000 1,247,800 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 623,954 46,300 130,000 342,700 733,000 1,364,000 
SCF 
Age eligible 404,668 -6,300 320 33,200 220,550 794,700 
VRI eligible 970,294 28,860 96,350 262,100 792,400 2,109,000 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 871,897 18,000 76,870 219,500 674,000 1,953,500 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
 
  
Table 9.  Stock Ownership 
 
A.  Share:  VRI, HRS, and SCF (Percent) 
  Percentiles  
 Sample Screen 10 25 50 75 90 N 
VRI 
All 14.96 35.12 54.76 74.71 91.14 8905 
Employer-sponsored 8.42 28.88 50.00 72.04 90.00 2233 
Individual client 18.55 37.37 56.06 75.33 91.52 6672 
HRS 
Age eligible 0 0   0 40.32 81.48 11595 
VRI eligible 0 0 29.20 70.75 90.54 3684 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 0 0 20.93 67.86 89.05 1553 
SCF 
Age eligible 0 0   0.70 43.39 71.24 2624 
VRI eligible 2.77 19.94 42.34 61.85 84.74 1275 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 6.98 21.51 40.66 61.04 83.33 665 
Note:  See text and note to Table 4 for sample screens.  Respondents with less than $1000 in financial assets are coded as having a 
zero stock share. 
 
B.  Amount: VRI, HRS, and SCF (Dollars) 
  Percentiles  
 Sample Screen 10 25 50 75 90 N 
VRI 
All 30,000 113,800 326,162 712,200 1,397,710 8905 
Employer-sponsored 13,500   65,428 221,443 551,365 1,047,212 2233 
Individual client 41,415 138,220 365,174 765,400 1,477,515 6672 
HRS 
Age eligible          0            0            0   45,000    270,000 11595 
VRI eligible          0            0   30,000 200,000    520,000 3684 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset          0            0   15,000 150,000    453,700 1553 
SCF Age eligible          0            0            0   78,000    360,000 2624 VRI eligible   3,000   22,750 105,000 357,000 1,227,600 1275 
 VRI eligible, 401(k) subset   4,500   21,000   86,000 306,500 1,168,500 665 
  
Figure 1. Administrative versus Survey Financial Assets at Vanguard 
 
Note:  The figure compares Vanguard administrative assets with survey report of Vanguard 
assets.  See the text for how Vanguard assets are determined in survey.  The chart shows box and 
whiskers figures for each decile of administrative assets (diamond is the mean; middle line is 
median; box is inter-quartile range [IQR]; outer lines upper and lower fences [1.5 times the IQR 
from the box]; and circles denote outliers). Amounts on the horizontal axis are medians of each 
decile ($1000).   Log scale is used on both axes. 
 
  
Figure 2.  Correction Paths through Wealth Section. 
 
 
 
Note:  The figure shows the fraction of respondents taking various paths through the account-
based wealth section.  Other includes those who started over and then took various paths to 
complete. 
  
Figure 3.  Distribution of normalized financial wealth (kernel estimation) 
A. VRI vs HRS  
 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset  
  
Figure 4.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
A. VRI vs HRS  
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange/dashed line) and o denotes VRI (blue/solid line). 
 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset  
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange/dashed line) and o denotes VRI (blue/solid line). 
Figure 5.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
A. SCF 
 
B. SCF 401(k) subset 
Figure 6.  Implied Changes in Retirement Horizon: 40% Decline in Stock Market 
A. Comparison of VRI and HRS Estimates 
 
B. Alternative Scenarios using VRI Estimates 
 
Note: Lines are LOESS estimates from Figure 4 (confidence intervals and observation not shown).  The figure 
shows the predicted change in the retirement horizon (years to retirement) resulting from a 40% decline in the stock 
market.  In panel A, the HRS-overall applies the mean HRS wealth and stock share to the HRS estimates.  The HRS-
average stockholder applies the mean VRI wealth and stock share to the HRS estimates while the VRI-average 
stockholder applies the same mean VRI wealth and stock share to the VRI estimates.  In panel B, the VRI-average 
stockholder is same as in panel A.  The other two treatments show high stock exposure and high-wealth households.  
See text for details. 
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Appendix A. Account Sequence Example 
Section 2.2 of the main text explained the structure of the wealth section of the survey in detail.  
In this appendix, we show actual screen shots from the wealth section for a hypothetical 
respondent who has two IRAs, one 401(k) pension, one checking account and one mutual fund 
account.   
 The respondent starts the wealth section by entering all the types of accounts she has  
(Figure A-A1).  She answers how many accounts she has for each type using a drop-down menu 
(Figure A-A2) and then gives each of the accounts a nickname (Figure A-A3).  The survey 
shows the summary of responses so far (Figure A-A4) and asks whether all the information 
given is correct.  If the respondent clicks no, then she can either add/delete the account type or 
add/delete accounts within each type.   
 After this first check point, the survey then loops over the accounts and asks the balance 
of each (Figure A-A5 is one example).  After the loop, the survey displays a summary table of 
account balances as well as a total (Figure A-A6).  In this example, the respondent did not 
provide a response to the balance question for the second IRA account (“Roth IRA”), so she sees 
“No response provided” for Reported Value under that account.  Let us say that the respondent 
clicks “No” to “Is this correct?” under the summary table.  Then the respondent is asked whether 
she wants to add/delete accounts or correct balances (Figure A-A7).  In this example, the 
respondent chooses to correct balances, indicates that she wants to correct the balance for “Roth 
IRA” (Figure A-A8), and then corrects the balance for that account (Figure A-A9).  During the 
corrections, the previously provided answers are shown above the question (in this case “Not 
answered”).  The respondent comes back to the summary screen again, indicates whether she 
referred to records to provide information on each account, and then confirms that all the 
responses are correct (Figure A-A10).  
 The survey then asks two follow-up questions for each account: stock share (Figure A-
A11) and whether that account is held at Vanguard (Figure A-A12).  Note that the survey does 
not ask these questions about the checking account that this respondent reported since it is a 
transactional account not offered at Vanguard.  Based on these responses, the survey calculates 
the share of wealth held at Vanguard and the stock share of the total portfolio, and it shows these 
as charts along with the summary table of balances (Figure A-A13).  The respondent can print 
this summary page as a record.  
Figure A-A1. Types of Accounts 
 
 
  
Figure A-A2. Number of Accounts 
 
Figure A-A3. Nickname Accounts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-A4. Account Verification 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure A-A5.  Account Balance 
 
Figure A-A6.  Balance Verification 
 
Figure A-A7. Indicate What Type of Correction(s) 
 
Figure A-A8.  Indicate What Needs to Be Corrected 
 
 
 Figure A-A9.  Correction of Previous Response(s) 
 
Figure A-A10.  Revised Balance Summary 
 
 
Figure A-A11. Account-by-account Stock Share 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-A12. Which Accounts at Vanguard 
 
 
 
  
Figure A-A13.  Summary Table and Charts 
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Appendix B.  Definition of concepts 
 This appendix defines concepts used for the VRI and how we measure them in the HRS 
and SCF. 
Total financial wealth.   In the VRI, total financial wealth is the sum of all financial 
account balances (the items listed in Table 2) plus miscellaneous financial items (in non-account, 
cleanup questions) minus non-mortgage debt.  For the SCF, financial wealth is total financial 
assets (FIN in the public version of data) minus non-mortgage debt (sum of CCBAL, INSTALL 
and ODEBT in the public version of data).  For the HRS, financial wealth is the sum of total 
financial wealth (atof in RAND version), IRA wealth, and employer-sponsored plan and pension 
account balances. For the HRS 2012, we constructed these variables using RAND definitions. 
(We are grateful to Margaret Lay for sharing her construction of these variables.) 
Web-survey eligibility. For the VRI, respondents are Web-survey eligible if the client is 
registered for Web access with Vanguard, if the registration has a valid email address, if the 
client logged in to the Vanguard Website at least once in the last six months, and if the client was 
not been recently included in another survey by Vanguard, and if the client had not requested 
exclusion from contacts for surveys.  We need to simulate this set of screens in the HRS and SCF 
in order to select comparable respondents. We designate HRS respondents as Web-survey 
eligible if they use the Internet regularly.  In the SCF, respondents are designated Web-survey 
eligible if they use the Internet to obtain information about borrowing/investing.   
Asset cut-off.  In the HRS, we impose a $10,000 cut-off on total financial assets net of 
checking, saving and money market balances.  In the SCF, we impose a $10,000 cut-off on the 
sum of IRA, mutual funds and account type pensions. 
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Appendix C. Detailed Comparisons: VRI, HRS and SCF 
This appendix compares the VRI with the most recent waves of the HRS (2012) and SCF (2013) 
in more detail.  It compares surveys along dimensions including wealth, income and 
demographics.  For each dimension, we also provide comparisons conditional on age groups to 
control for the effect of different age compositions across surveys.  
Recall that the age distribution differs across the samples.  Table A-C1 compares median 
value of wealth by age group to see whether the difference in the overall wealth distribution is 
caused by differences in age.  Even after imposing the similar sampling screens, the VRI sample 
has a higher median wealth for almost all the age groups.  Again, the gap is much smaller when 
the HRS and SCF samples are compared with the employer-sponsored sample of the VRI.  For 
the HRS, the gap shrinks further if we condition on respondents with at least $10,000 in 401(k)s 
or similar pension accounts.  (Statistics for the age group 65+ under employer-sponsored 
conditions or 401(k) subset conditions are not very informative due to the small number of 
observations.)   
 Income.  Tables A-C2 and A-C3 compare household annual income across samples.  
Compared to the overall population of the HRS and SCF, the VRI sample is not only wealthier, 
but also has higher income.  The difference in income is, however, much smaller than the 
difference in wealth.  If we impose the VRI screens, except for the oldest age group, income 
levels from the SCF are actually higher than the VRI; those from the HRS are quite comparable 
to those from the VRI.  As a result, the wealth-to-income ratio is much higher for the VRI 
sample, as shown in Tables A-C4 and A-C5.  This suggests that the high level of wealth of in the 
VRI sample is not just due to the high level of lifetime income.  They likely also save more, 
though other differences (e.g., inherited wealth) might be relevant.   
 Demographics.  Table A-C6 compares education, health and marital status across 
samples.  Tables A-C7, A-C8 and A-C9 compare the distributions of each of these variables by 
age bins.  The VRI sample has a very high education level.  Approximately 70% of the sample 
has a college degree with over half of those having an advanced degree.  The education level is 
higher for the individual client sample.  In contrast, only about 30% of that sample has a college 
degree in the HRS and the SCF.  If we impose the VRI-equivalent screen, however, this gap 
almost disappears when compared to the employer-sponsored sample in the VRI.  The college 
degree rates from the SCF and HRS are, under VRI-eligible conditions, similar to the VRI rate.  
For the HRS, the gap is further reduced for the 401(k) subset.  Compared to the individual client 
sample, the HRS and SCF rates are still lower, though the gap is reduced considerably under the 
VRI-eligibility condition. 
 The VRI respondents are much healthier than the overall population with more than 70% 
reporting that their health is either excellent or very good.  The corresponding percentage in the 
total HRS is about 40%. The SCF uses a different four-point scale, without the “very good” 
category.  The fraction of respondents with excellent health is much higher in the VRI (31%) 
than in the SCF (18%).  The gap is much smaller, though does not fully disappear, after imposing 
the VRI sampling screens on the HRS and the SCF.     
 The fraction of coupled households (defined as either married or partnered) in the VRI is 
67%, which is roughly what was targeted by oversampling administrative singles.  Even after 
this oversampling of singles, the fraction of coupled households is larger than that in the overall 
sample of the HRS and the SCF.  Without imposing the VRI screens, the corresponding 
percentages are about 51% in the HRS and 53% in the SCF.  After imposing the VRI sampling 
criteria, coupled rates from the HRS and the SCF overshoot the VRI levels for most of the age 
groups owing to the VRI’s oversampling of singles.  
 Table A-C10 compares retirement rates.  Because the incidence of retirement changes so 
much with age, it makes sense to compare by age groups.  Overall, once the VRI screens are 
imposed, the retirement rates are quite similar across the SCF and VRI.  HRS respondents retire 
somewhat earlier relative to both the SCF and the VRI. 
 
Table A-C1.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Median wealth by age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
All 663,100 496,350 715,790   60,000 272,000 342,700  33,200 262,100 219,500 
55-59 518,289 428,280 607,900   55,000 226,400 283,000  21,940 208,700 197,070 
60-64 601,556 521,245 669,000   58,600 276,000 364,000  36,580 236,100 225,100 
65-69 715,627 574,250 750,750   83,000 350,000 435,000  57,000 299,400 463,500 
70-74 746,000 671,000 755,550   64,000 310,000 434,000  52,000 410,700 348,000 
75-100 726,604 605,300 729,950   50,000 284,000 334,500  27,000 275,500 143,000 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
  
Table A-C2.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Income distribution 
   Percentiles 
  
     Mean       10       25       50     75     90 
VRI 
All 121,481 27,004 50,000 82,017 125,000 191,616 
Employer-sponsored 122,800 42,370 65,000 100,000 146,000 218,201 
Individual client 121,040 24,000 45,000 76,655 119,133 180,000 
HRS 
Age eligible 65,856 8,476 15,384 30,400 70,300 145,604 
VRI eligible 110,274 17,532 31,600 63,000 123,240 230,000 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 134,119 25,927 48,001 87,030 153,010 262,000 
SCF 
Age eligible 90,848 13,189 22,320 42,601 85,221 160,296 
VRI eligible 177,786 36,219 54,785 91,308 160,296 295,229 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 197,214 43,625 66,959 101,453 173,484 320,592 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A-C3.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Median income by age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 92,100 100,000 84,943   50,500 84,003 97,000  57,785 94,351 96,380 
65-74 79,704 100,698 75,130   29,756 46,659 62,051  45,654 91,308 115,657 
75- 71,755 73,343 71,703   18,660 30,432 38,437  28,407 66,553 92,322 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
  
Table A-C4.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Wealth to income ratio 
   Percentiles 
  
  Mean      10      25      50    75    90 
VRI (SCF measure) 
All 42.97 1.95 4.28 8.37 15.15 24.13 
Employer-sponsored 57.63 0.96 2.25 4.93 8.87 14.31 
Individual client 38.05 2.74 5.31 9.77 17.17 26.30 
HRS 
Age eligible 44.89 -0.04 0.04 1.46 5.95 16.39 
VRI eligible 95.97 0.59 1.50 3.80 10.39 24.49 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 25.30 0.64 1.54 3.35 8.04 17.38 
SCF 
Age eligible 3.13 -0.21 0.02 0.76 3.34 7.94 
VRI eligible 5.70 0.42 1.20 3.01 6.51 13.00 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 4.02 0.26 1.01 2.21 4.90 8.24 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A-C5.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Median wealth to income ratio by age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 5.90 3.79 7.13 
 
1.01 2.70 2.88  0.53 2.24 2.01 
65-74 9.53 5.16 10.1 
 
1.71 5.89 5.88  1.01 4.38 3.27 
75- 11.36 9.36 11.11 
 
2.55 9.08 9.85  0.92 4.87 1.41 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
  
Table A-C6.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Education, Health, and Marital Status. 
  
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
  
Total 
Employer- 
Sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) 
subset 
 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) 
subset 
Education College grad.  32.18% 33.69% 31.67% 
 
14.25% 22.62% 23.26%  16.26% 27.43% 25.87% 
 
Post grad. 38.45% 26.24% 42.53% 
 
14.64% 26.36% 30.54%  14.32% 28.39% 28.55% 
Health Poor 0.84% 0.53% 0.94% 
 
7.60% 2.25% 1.71%  10.32% 2.50% 2.42% 
 
Fair 4.77% 3.48% 5.20% 
 
19.10% 11.10% 9.01%  26.19% 15.67% 17.02% 
 
Good 21.77% 22.33% 21.58% 
 
31.81% 29.39% 30.29%  45.34% 55.46% 53.51% 
 
Very good 41.84% 42.25% 41.71% 
 
31.43% 41.30% 42.27%     
 
Excellent 30.78% 31.42% 30.57% 
 
10.06% 15.95% 16.71%  18.14% 26.37% 27.05% 
Marital Coupled 67.21% 73.88% 64.97% 
 
52.46% 69.89% 77.82%  53.18% 71.04% 74.97% 
Status Single 32.79% 26.12% 35.03% 
 
47.54% 30.11% 22.72%  46.82% 28.96% 25.03% 
Note:  HRS and SCF education is based on years of schooling (college grad is exactly 16 years and post-grad is more than 16 years). VRI education is based on 
degree attainment.  SCF health has a four-point scale, while VRI and HRS health have five-point scales.  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A-C7.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Fraction with College Degree by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF  
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 68.38% 57.61% 78.69% 
 
32.12% 48.92% 50.30%  40.83% 61.96% 60.04% 
65-74 73.08% 66.83% 74.18% 
 
26.67% 46.78% 55.18%  39.48% 66.64% 68.12% 
75- 69.52% 54.27% 69.82% 
 
21.28% 46.03% 64.19%  20.85% 52.82% 29.06% 
Note: Education is based on attainment.  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights.  
Table A-C8.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens:  Fraction with Very Good or Excellent Health by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 75.61% 73.43% 77.70% 
 
43.82% 57.82% 59.73%  19.81% 25.92% 24.77% 
65-74 75.35% 74.30% 75.54% 
 
43.69% 58.74% 57.26%  23.67% 32.43% 38.77% 
75- 61.13% 74.29% 60.87% 
 
34.85% 51.38% 56.25%  10.96% 8.91% 0.28% 
Note:  SCF does not have ‘Very Good’ category, so the fraction captures respondents with Excellent health only.  HRS and SCF 
tabulations use sampling weights. 
Table A-C9.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens:  Fraction Married or Partnered by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 66.05% 73.72% 58.69% 
 
58.88% 72.05% 77.28%  58.45% 71.78% 73.27% 
65-74 68.65% 74.82% 67.57% 
 
56.60% 69.95% 79.06%  56.26% 72.70% 78.88% 
75- 66.26% 65.72% 66.26% 
 
36.46% 60.74% 80.57%  40.23% 60.82% 97.12% 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
Table A-C10.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Retirement Rate by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
Client 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
All 55.80% 17.78% 68.52%   63.99% 53.23% 36.70%  56.56% 33.92% 16.87% 
55-59 9.43% 4.57% 14.75%   24.42% 19.61% 13.84%  19.88% 7.65% 5.34% 
60-64 26.68% 12.39% 38.86%   50.25% 42.05% 34.10%  38.62% 24.56% 15.90% 
65-69 62.14% 34.13% 69.91%   76.50% 73.16% 66.15%  59.72% 44.39% 34.15% 
70-74 81.23% 57.96% 83.31%   87.18% 85.16% 80.70%  77.06% 67.07% 49.44% 
75-100 91.38% 74.29% 91.72%   91.57% 92.95% 90.84%  92.16% 87.37% 69.44% 
Note: HRS retirement rate includes respondents with partial retirement. For SCF retirement rate variable ‘OCCAT1’ in the public version of data is used.  
Households are defined to be retired if ‘OCCAT1=3’, which also includes disabled, age +65 and not working, etc.  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling 
weights. 
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Appendix D.  Estimating Retirement/Wealth Relationship 
HRS sample.  Table A-D1 shows how many observations we lose in the HRS by imposing each 
additional condition on samples used.  As we have seen from Table 5, the majority of the HRS 
samples are older than 65.  Among those households in which the main breadwinner satisfies the 
age condition, some are retired while some have dual main breadwinners.  In addition, for many 
households that are not retired, responses for the expected retirement age are missing. 1  All of 
these conditions account for the small sample size used in the HRS.   
LOESS curve and scatter plots including outliers.  In Figure A-D1, we show the estimated 
relationship between retirement plan and wealth from the VRI (Panel A) and the HRS (Panel B) 
for the full range.   
Estimation with future DB pension and Social Security income included in the normalized 
wealth.  In the LOESS estimation in Section 5, expected DB pension and Social Security income 
are included as a control (𝑌𝑖𝑅).  Here, we estimate another version of the model where we define 
the normalized wealth as the sum of the replacement rate from the annuitizable financial wealth 
and that from the expected annuity income (𝑌𝑖𝑅).  Figure A-D2 shows the distribution of newly 
defined normalized wealth and Figure A-D3 shows the new LOESS estimates.  For both figures, 
Panel A is for the entire sample used in Section 5.  Panel B is for the employer-sponsored 
subsets.  
                                                          
1 Some breadwinners who are not retired report that they are not currently working, leading to 
missing responses for expected retirement age.  In addition, questions about retirement age are 
asked only when the respondents said that they plan to retire or stop working.  
 Figure A-D2A shows that the VRI sample still has higher replacement rates, though the 
gap is less stark than in Figure 3A.  The VRI has many observations in the range between 1 and 
2, while for the HRS, most of the observations have normalized wealth smaller than 1.  The 
LOESS estimate (Figure A-D3A) shows basically the same relationship as the baseline model 
(Figure 4A).  With the VRI sample, we can estimate a negative and statistically significant 
relationship for a wider range (between 0 and 2), while the HRS sample shows a steeper slope up 
to about 0.5 but then becomes flat and statistically insignificant. With the employer-sponsored 
subset, the distributions of normalized wealth are pretty similar across the VRI and HRS (Figure 
A-D2B).  Figure A-D3B shows that conditioning on this subset does not affect the estimated 
relationship between wealth and retirement plan for the VRI, while for the HRS, the estimates 
get very noisy due to the small number of observations.    
 
Table A-D1. HRS Sample Size for Retirement Horizon Analysis: Effect of Each Condition 
Condition Number of observations 
(1) None 11,595 
(2) Main breadwinner age ≤ 65 5,206 
(3) (2) + Main breadwinner not retired,  
No dual breadwinner 
 
2,442 
(4) (3) + Have expected retirement age 1,053 
 
  
Figure A-D1.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
(full range of data) 
A. VRI 
 
B. HRS 
 
Figure A-D2.  Distribution of normalized financial wealth (including future DB pension and SS 
income) 
A. VRI vs HRS  
 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset 
 
Figure A-D3.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
(Normalized wealth including future DB pension and SS income) 
A. VRI vs HRS 
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange) and o denotes VRI (blue). 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset 
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange) and o denotes VRI (blue). 
